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PUSHBACK: TITLE VII  
TAKES ON HOBBY LOBBY   
 
Carole Okolowicz* 
I. INTRODUCTION    
In 2014, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,1 the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that three employers with religious objections 
to birth control did not have to comply with a portion of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) that required 
employers to cover birth control in their employee health plans.2 
One of the purposes of the ACA’s contraceptive mandate was to 
remedy sex discrimination in the health plan employers offer to their 
employees. 3  Congress had found that without birth control 
coverage, women pay much more out of pocket for their health care 
than men,4 making the plans less valuable to women. Prior to the 
enactment of the ACA in 2010, some lower courts had determined 
that an employer’s refusal to cover birth control in its otherwise 
comprehensive health plan was sex discrimination against female 
employees under a different law,5 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.6 
In Hobby Lobby, however, the employees were not a party,7 and the 
Court did not have to consider their rights. The Court determined, 
without hearing from the employees, that its ruling would have no 
                                                
* I would like to thank the University of San Francisco School of Law 
Professor Maria Ontiveros for her guidance and support.  
1 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014). 
2 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2010). 
3 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2789; Priests for Life v. United States HHS, 772 
F.3d 229, 259 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
4 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2788-89. 
5 Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001); 
EEOC v. UPS, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (D. Minn. 2001). 
6 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1991). 
7 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759 (noting that parties were the owners of 
three corporations and the government.). 
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effect on the female employees because birth control would be 
covered, albeit not by the employer.8 In its ruling, the Court placed 
the employer’s religious rights above female employees’ right to be 
treated equally to their male coworkers.  
The Hobby Lobby9 case was wrongly decided; in allowing 
for-profit employers with religious objections to avoid covering 
birth control in their employee health plans, the Court allowed the 
employers to discriminate against female workers in their employee 
benefits. Female employees should have a cause of action under 
Title VII to require their employers to cover birth control regardless 
of the employers’ religious views if the plan also covers the health 
needs of men.10 This Note analyzes the Title VII claims of female 
employees for sex discrimination in this situation. It finds that the 
one reason why plaintiffs will be precluded from bringing such 
claims is that under the accommodation in Hobby Lobby, there is no 
harm to employees, which is a necessary element under Title VII. 
However, the harm element could be met depending on the future 
of the ACA. 
Part II explains the background of this issue, describing the 
importance of access to birth control for women, the ACA’s 
contraceptive mandate, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(“RFRA”), 11  and the Hobby Lobby ruling and dissent. Part III 
begins the Title VII analysis by looking at the two issues facing the 
plaintiffs in the prima facie stage: the proper comparator to female 
birth control (Part A) and the plaintiffs’ harm (Part B). This section 
finds that as the law presently stands Hobby Lobby allows unequal 
treatment of female employees, but these employees currently 
suffer no material harm.  If plaintiffs can prove the prima facie case, 
Part IV analyzes the claims under the disparate impact theory (Part 
                                                
8 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760.  
9 See generally, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751 (2014) (holding that the 
ACA’s contraceptive mandate violated RFRA, substantially burdening for-
profit corporation’s religious objections to contraception, and was not the 
least restrictive means). 
10 This recommendation does not apply to “ministers” of a church or other 
house of worship because those employees are exempted from Title VII. See 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C.,132 
U.S. 171, 188-89 (2012) (noting that application of Title VII to ministers 
violates the Establishment Clause). 
11 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993). 
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A) and the disparate treatment theory (Part B). The disparate 
treatment claim delves into the religious motives of the employer, 
which courts may not question, while disparate impact avoids that 
inquiry and is more likely to be successful because of it. 
 
II.  BACKGROUND: BIRTH CONTROL, THE AFFORDABLE 
CARE ACT, RFRA, AND HOBBY LOBBY 
 
A. Importance of Birth Control 
 
Birth control is important to women’s preventive health care 
needs. First, many women who use birth control use it for reasons 
other than preventing pregnancy. Most forms of female birth control 
contain hormones and can be used as a hormonal treatment. 12 
Fourteen percent of all women using the birth control pill, and one-
third of teen users, use it exclusively for non-contraceptive reasons 
(58% use it to prevent both a health condition and pregnancy).13 
Common non-contraceptive uses include reduction of cramps and 
menstrual pain, menstrual regulation, treatment of endometriosis, 
and treatment of acne.14 Second, most women use birth control to 
prevent unplanned pregnancies, which can have detrimental effects 
on a woman’s health.15 For women with certain health conditions, 
like diabetes or obesity, pregnancy can worsen their condition. 
Using birth control to prevent pregnancy allows these women to 
reduce that risk by getting their condition under control first before 
                                                
12 American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Noncontraceptive Benefits 
of Birth Control Pills (2011), 
https://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/Resources/Patient_Re
sources/Fact_Sheets_and_Info_Booklets/Noncontraceptive%20benefits%20
of%20BCP-final_1-5-12.pdf. 
13 Rebecca Wind, “Many American Women Use Birth Control Pills for Non-
Contraceptive Reasons: One-third of teen users rely on the pill exclusively 
for these purposes”, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE (November 15, 2011) 
https://www.guttmacher.org/news-release/2011/many-american-women-
use-birth-control-pills-noncontraceptive-reasons. 
14 Id.  
15  See generally, Institute of Medicine, Inst. of Med., Clinical Preventive 
Services for Women: Closing the Gap, 102-04 (2011), 
https://www.nap.edu/read/13181/chapter/1 [hereinafter IOM]. 
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becoming pregnant.16 Women with certain other conditions, such as 
pulmonary hypertension and cyanotic heart disease, must avoid 
pregnancy altogether.17 Even for healthy women, pregnancy can 
involve complications such as gestational diabetes, hypertension, 
anemia, and even death.18 
Unplanned pregnancy can be detrimental to women in other 
important aspects of their lives as well. Women who have 
unintended pregnancies are more likely to experience domestic 
violence than women whose pregnancies are intended.19 For some 
women, having a child could create a financial burden at a time 
when the woman and her family cannot shoulder such a burden 
without serious detriment.20 Some women may have educational or 
professional goals they would like to achieve before devoting their 
time and energy to raising a child. By allowing women to control 
when they get pregnant, birth control gives them some measure of 
control over their lives. The U.S. Supreme Court has said that “[t]he 
ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social 
life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their 
reproductive lives.” 21  American women know this; 88% of all 
sexually-active women have used or are using birth control.22 
                                                
16 Priests for Life v. United States HHS, 772 F.3d 229, 262 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(vacated and remanded by Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016)). 
17 IOM, supra note 15, at 103. 
18 See generally, Pregnancy Complications, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
AND PREVENTION (June 17, 2016), 
http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth/pregcomplicati
ons.htm.  
19  IOM, supra note 15, at 103(noting that women with unintended 
pregnancies are more likely than those with intended pregnancies to 
experience domestic violence during pregnancy). 
20 Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 263 (“An unintended pregnancy is virtually 
certain to impose substantial, unplanned-for expenses and time demands . . . 
[which] fall disproportionately on women.”) 
21  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 
(1992). 
22 Kimberly Daniels, Ph.D., et al., Contraceptive Methods Women Have Ever 
Used: United States, 1982-2010, 62 NAT’L HEALTH STAT. REP. 1 (Feb. 14, 
2013), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr062.pdf (noting that 88% of 
women have used a female form of birth control in their lifetime and 99% 
have used at least one form, including male condoms). 
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Studies have found that unintended pregnancies can also 
have detrimental effects on the child.23 Pregnancies that are too 
close together can result in low birth weight.24 Women who do not 
know they are pregnant may delay prenatal care and may continue 
risky behaviors, like smoking or drinking alcohol.25 Use of birth 
control helps to prevent unwanted pregnancies and therefore, helps 
prevent abortions. In 2001, 42% of all unintended pregnancies in 
America ended in abortion.26 
Because birth control use is so common, if insurance does 
not cover it, women as a class pay more out of pocket for their health 
care than men.27  
 
B. The Contraceptive Mandate 
 
In 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act which imposes fines on 
employers with fifty or more full-time employees that do not offer 
health insurance to their employees.28 The law requires the health 
plan to cover preventive treatments and services at no cost to 
employees and their dependents, including coverage of all approved 
contraceptive drugs and devices.29 This is what has been termed 
“the contraceptive mandate.”30 
The initial version of the law required coverage of 
preventive services, like vaccines, but did not include the 
contraceptive mandate. Congress included preventive services 
because it knew that if people took steps to prevent health problems, 
the nation’s health would improve and healthcare costs would 
                                                
23 IOM, supra note 15, at 103. 
24 IOM, supra note 15, at 103. 
25 IOM, supra note 15, at 103. 
26 IOM, supra note 15, at 103. 
27 Priests for Life v. United States HHS, 772 F.3d 229, 263 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(“in general, women of childbearing age spend 68 percent more in out-of-
pocket health care costs than men.”) (quoting 155 CONG. REC. 28, 843 
(2009)(statement of Sen. Gillbrand). 
28 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a), (c)(2)(A) (2010); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014). 
29 26 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2010). 
30 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759 (using the term “contraceptive mandate”). 
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drop. 31  Senator Barbara Mikulski noticed that the requirements 
ignored the needs of women and introduced the Women’s Health 
Amendment, which added “preventive services specific to women’s 
health.”32 Sen. Mikulski introduced the amendment in response to 
the hurdles women face in getting health insurance coverage for 
preventive services particular to women.33 Sen. Mikulski told the 
New York Times “[t]he insurance companies take being a woman 
as a pre-existing condition. . . . We can’t get health insurance 
because of pre-existing conditions called a C-section.”34 The Senate 
debate over the amendment focused on coverage of 
mammograms. 35  Senator Diane Feinstein noted that without 
adequate coverage, “[w]omen of childbearing age spend 68 percent 
more in out-of-pocket health care costs than men.” 36  The 
amendment aimed at addressing these disparities and improving 
women’s health. 
After Congress passed the ACA with the Women’s 
Amendment, it directed a federal agency, the Health Resources and 
Services Administration (“HRSA”), 37  to determine which 
“preventive services specific to women’s health” should be covered. 
HRSA in turn commissioned a study from the independent Institute 
of Medicine (“IOM”). 38  The IOM recommended including 
                                                
31 Priests for Life v. United States HHS, 772 F.3d 229, 260 (2014). 
32 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2788; See also David Herszenhorn & Robert 
Pear, Senate Passes Women’s Health Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (December 3, 
2009), https://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/senate-passes-
womens-health-amendment/. 
33  David Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Senate Passes Women’s Health 
Amendment, ɴ.ʏ. ᴛɪᴍᴇs (December 3, 2009), 
https://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/senate-passes-womens-
health-amendment/. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2788. 
37  The HRSA is a component of the Department of Health and Human 
Resources. Bureaus and Offices, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVICES 
ADMINISTRATION, 
https://www.hrsa.gov/about/organization/bureaus/index.html (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2017). 
38 Priests for Life v. United States HHS, 772 F.3d 229, 260 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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contraception with the other covered preventive services because 
numerous studies showed the detrimental effect unplanned 
pregnancies can have on women’s physical health, as well as other 
aspects of women’s lives. 39  HRSA adopted the IOM’s 
recommendations, concluding that because of women’s 
reproductive health needs and the significant costs involved, the 
ACA’s preventive services requirement should include 
contraceptive coverage. 40  The government found that when 
employers do not cover the preventive services needs of women, 
including contraception, the resulting disparity “placed women in 
the workforce at a disadvantage compared to their male 
coworkers.”41 
Almost immediately, employers with religious objections to 
contraception began disputing the requirement and there was a 
powerful law to assist them in those claims – the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993. 
 
C. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
 
Under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, 
“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of 
religion].”42 In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Smith that 
under the Free Exercise Clause, if Congress makes a law that is 
“neutral” and “generally applicable,” all people must abide by it 
even if it infringes on their religious beliefs.43  
Congress disagreed. In 1993, in a direct response to Smith, 
Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(“RFRA”),44 which created greater protection for religious rights 
when a neutral law infringes on a person’s religious beliefs. Under 
RFRA, a person is relieved of complying with a neutral law of 
general applicability if doing so “substantially burden[s]” her 
exercise of her religion, unless the government can show that it has 
                                                
39 See supra, Part II.A.; IOM, supra note 15, at 102-04. 
40 Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 261. 
41 77 Fed. Reg. 8725. 
42 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
43 Emp’t Div. Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990). 
44 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993). 
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a compelling interest in the law and the law is the least restrictive 
means of achieving that interest.45 If the religious person proves her 
case and the government cannot meet this high burden of proof, the 
person is exempt from the law.  
Many of the RFRA claims in the employment context have 
been brought by employees against their government employers.46 
The bulk of the cases in which employers sought RFRA’s protection 
have been against the ACA’s contraceptive mandate. However, 
employers have brought claims against other laws, notably anti-
discrimination laws. 47  Prior to RFRA’s enactment, employers 
brought free exercise claims against laws involving minimum wage 
and equal pay for women. 48  Those claims were not successful 
because under Smith, the two laws are “neutral laws of general 
applicability,” so the employers were not successful. 
There is nothing in the statutory text of RFRA that requires 
consideration of the effect that such an exemption would have on 
third parties, such as the employees. 
 
D. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 
 
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,49 the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that RFRA protects not only an individual’s right to 
                                                
45 Id. at § 2000bb-(1)(b). 
46 See Holly v. Jewell, 196 F. Supp. 3d 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (discussing that 
a National Park Service employee alleged the employer discriminated on the 
basis of his religion); Tagore v. U.S., 735 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2013) (discussing 
that an IRS employee alleged employer’s policy of no blades discriminated 
against her Sikh religion); Francis v. Mineta, 505 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(discussing that a National Transportation Administration employee alleged 
the employer discriminated on basis of his religion when he was fired for 
wearing dreadlocks). 
47 See E.E.O.C. v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., No. 14-13710, 
2016 WL 4396083 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 18, 2016) (on appeal) (holding 
compliance with Title VII to allow transgender employee to wear a skirt 
imposed a substantial burden on employer’s religious beliefs under RFRA). 
48 Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303 (1985) 
(minimum wage); Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1392 
(4th Cir. 1990) (equal pay). 
49 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
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practice his or her religion but also a for-profit corporation’s right 
to practice its religion.50 In Hobby Lobby, three corporations, Hobby 
Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel, claimed that the contraceptive 
mandate infringed on the exercise of their religion by forcing them 
to cover birth control51 in their employee health plans, the use of 
which they believe to be a sin.52 The Court agreed and allowed them 
an accommodation from the law, one that the ACA already had in 
place for nonprofit corporations.53 If the corporation notifies the 
government of its religious objections to contraceptives, the 
government will tell the corporation’s insurance provider to exclude 
birth control coverage under the company’s health plan. 54  The 
insurer then will pay for contraception “without imposing any cost-
sharing requirements on the [corporation], the group health plan, or 
plan participants or beneficiaries.”55 Justice Alito, writing for the 
majority in Hobby Lobby, determined that the effect of this 
accommodation on the female employees would be “precisely zero” 
because contraceptives would be covered.56 
In holding that the corporations’ religious rights were 
burdened, the majority noted that a corporation is a fictional legal 
entity that does not itself have religious beliefs.57  Corporations, 
wrote Justice Alito, are essentially “the human beings who own, 
run, and are employed by them.”58 But somehow, the right to the 
                                                
50 Id. at 2775. 
51 Id. at 2764-65 (discussing that the owners of the three corporations had 
objections only to four of the forms of birth control they were required to 
cover which they called “abortifacients,” or like an abortion. The four forms 
included intrauterine devices (“IUDs”) and emergency contraception (also 
called the “morning after” pill). The owners believe that life begins at 
conception. Since these four devices or pills may operate to block a fertilized 
egg from growing, the owners believe they are abortion-like). 
52 Id. at 2764-65. 
53 45 C.F.R. § 147.131; Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782. 
54 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751. See also Priests for Life v. United States 
HHS, 772 F.3d 229, 236 (2014). 
55 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
56 Id. at 2782. 
57 Id. at 2768. 
58 Id. 
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free exercise of religion belongs only to “the humans who own and 
control” the corporation. 59  The Hobby Lobby claims were only 
brought by those who “own and control” the plaintiff corporations, 
not the employees or managers. The owners sued the government 
for infringing on their personal religious beliefs and the employees 
were not a party. Accordingly, the Court only had to consider the 
law’s impact on the owners, not on the employees.60  
Not only did the majority opinion fail to consider whether 
the employees agreed with their employer’s beliefs, it only 
fleetingly considered what effect abiding by those beliefs would 
have on the employees. The government had argued that RFRA 
must not be used to allow an employer with religious beliefs to 
avoid laws intended to benefit employees, such as minimum wage 
laws, anti-discrimination laws, and laws regulating employee health 
insurance benefits, because the benefits conferred are not so much 
gifts as they are the employees’ rights.61 It argued that employee 
health insurance in particular is part of the employee’s 
compensation.62Justice Alito disregarded that argument and held 
that the contraceptive mandate confers a benefit on employees and 
when a law confers a benefit on third parties, as opposed to relieving 
a burden, courts could exempt the employer from the law.63 Justice 
Alito did not consider the contraceptive mandate’s role in relieving 
a burden, that is, the inequality in the health plans offered to male 
and female employees, as was well-documented by Congress.64  
 
E. The Hobby Lobby Dissent 
 
The central focus of the four-Justice dissent in Hobby Lobby 
was the rights of the female employees. 65  Justice Ginsburg, in 
dissent, wrote that “[t]he exemption sought by Hobby Lobby and 
                                                
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 2769. 
61 Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 15, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
134 S. Ct. 1536 (2014) (No. 13-354). 
62 Id. 
63 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781, n.37. 
64 Priests for Life v. United States HHS, 772 F.3d 229, 262-64 (2014). 
65 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2790-91. 
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Conestoga would override significant interests of the corporations’ 
employees and covered dependents.”66 Justice Ginsburg noted that 
in no prior decision had RFRA allowed an exemption from a neutral 
law when allowing the exemption would be harmful to the very 
people the law was meant to protect. 67  She wrote that RFRA’s 
requirement that the government’s action must be the “least 
restrictive means” cannot be satisfied by taking away employees’ 
legal benefits so that their commercial employers can adhere to their 
own personal religious beliefs.68  
The dissent provides a powerful argument for why no 
commercial employer should be able to avoid laws intended to 
protect employees due to the employer’s religious objections. But 
the Hobby Lobby case provides an interesting twist. Unlike a 
minimum wage law which is designed to protect all employees, the 
contraceptive mandate was specifically designed to protect women. 
Justice Ginsburg explained that the mandate’s purposes were to 
correct “the disproportionate burden women carried for 
comprehensive health services and the adverse health 
consequences” that women suffer when contraception is not 
covered.69 Because the mandate was designed to address inequality 
based on a protected characteristic – sex – the Hobby Lobby ruling 
triggers Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 70  which prohibits 
employment discrimination. The question is whether this claim can 
succeed.  
 
III.  THE PRIMA FACIE CASE: IS THERE DISCRIMINATION? 
 
Justice Kennedy and the four Justices in dissent, confirmed 
that the government’s interest in “protect[ing] the health of female 
employees” was a “compelling interest,” as required under RFRA.71 
                                                
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 2801. 
68 Id. at 2802. 
69 Id. at 2789 (emphasis added). 
70 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1991). 
71 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785-86 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (confirming 
that the government had shown that it had a compelling interest in “providing 
insurance coverage that is necessary to protect the health of female 
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Even the majority opinion, which assumed without deciding that the 
government had a compelling interest, noted that the contraceptive 
mandate concerned women,72 not employees in general. 
Title VII prohibits discrimination in  “compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of [the 
employee’s] . . . sex.”73 “Health insurance and other fringe benefits 
are ‘compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment.’”74 Ultimately, it is the plaintiff’s burden to prove that 
the employer discriminated “because of” sex.75 If the plaintiff can 
make out an initial, prima facie case of discrimination, the employer 
will have a chance to rebut.76 If the plaintiff cannot make that initial 
showing, the case ends there. 
Under Title VII, there are generally two theories of 
discrimination: disparate treatment and disparate impact. 77  A 
disparate treatment claim argues that the employer intentionally 
treated an individual or group of employees worse than others 
because of the employee’s protected characteristic.78 In contrast, 
disparate impact claims concern “employment practices that are 
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact 
fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified 
by business necessity.”79  
                                                
employees” and that such coverage was “significantly more costly [for 
females] than for a male employee.”); See also id. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (noting there is a compelling interest in protecting “women’s well-
being”). 
72 Id. at 2760 (noting that “[t]he effect of the . . . accommodation on the 
women employed by Hobby Lobby. . .”); id. at 2782 (noting that “[t]he 
principal dissent identifies no reason why this accommodation would fail to 
protect the asserted needs of women . . . . Under the accommodation, the 
plaintiff’s female employees would continue to receive contraceptive 
coverage . . . .”). 
73 § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
74 Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., 462 U.S. 669, 
682 (1983). 
75 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977). 
76 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973). 
77 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335, n.15.  
78 Id. 
79 Id.  
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To make out a prima facie case of disparate treatment, a 
plaintiff must show that “(1) [s]he belongs to a protected class, (2) 
[s]he was subjected to an adverse job action; (3) [her] employer 
treated similarly situated employees outside [her] protected class 
more favorably; and (4) [s]he was qualified to do the job.”80 To 
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, the plaintiff must 
prove that a specific employment policy or practice causes a 
significant disparate impact on a group of employees who share 
plaintiff’s protected characteristic.81   
Under both claims, plaintiffs alleging sex discrimination by 
their Hobby Lobby-like employer will face two main issues in 
proving their prima facie case. Ultimately, plaintiffs must show that 
the employer treated them worse than it treated other similarly-
situated employees because of their sex. This involves finding a 
proper, similarly-situated comparator against which to compare the 
employer’s treatment of the plaintiffs, and proving that the plaintiffs 
actually were treated worse by showing they suffered a harm.  
 
A. Comparator: What is the male equivalent to birth 
control pills? 
 
In a disparate treatment claim, a plaintiff who has no direct 
evidence that her employer discriminated against her because she is 
a woman can nonetheless create an inference of sex discrimination 
by comparing the employer’s treatment of her to its treatment of a 
similarly situated male coworker.82 In a disparate impact claim, 
plaintiffs must show that the employer’s practices “fall more 
harshly on one group” as compared to another.83 In both cases, 
plaintiffs have the burden to prove that the group of coworkers to 
which they compare themselves is similar enough to the plaintiffs 
                                                
80 1 BARBARA LINDEMANN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 2-18 
(5th ed. 2012); Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 330 F.3d 1313, 1316 
(11th Cir. 2003) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 
801 (1973)). 
81 1 BARBARA LINDEMANN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 3-16 
(5th ed. 2012). 
82 Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011). 
83 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335, n.15. 
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so that a factfinder may infer discriminatory animus by the 
employer.  
In deciding whether a health plan discriminates on the basis 
of sex, courts may consider whether the health plan excludes a 
treatment for women but covers a similar treatment for men.84 The 
issue here is what male treatment is similar to female prescription 
birth control. This is not a simple task – the forms of male birth 
control are substantially different from female birth control, both in 
how they prevent pregnancy and in their subsequent effects, as men 
cannot get pregnant.  
There is a circuit split as to how similar comparators must 
be to a plaintiff, with some circuits holding they must be “nearly 
identical,”85 while other circuits hold they need only be similar “in 
all material respects.” 86  Regardless, the purpose of making the 
comparison is “to eliminate other possible explanatory variables [in 
order to] isolate the critical independent variable - discriminatory 
animus.” 87  The differences between the plaintiff and the 
comparators may not be “so significant that they render the 
comparison effectively useless.”88  
Few federal courts have decided the issue of whether 
exclusion of contraception from an employee health plan is sex 
discrimination under Title VII and what the proper comparator is.89 
                                                
84 Standridge v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. (In re Union Pac. R.R. Emp’t. Practices 
Litig.), 479 F.3d 936, 944 (8th Cir. 2007). 
85 Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 221 (5th Cir. 2001); Trask 
v. Sec’y Dep’t. of Veterans Affairs, 822 F.3d 1179, 1192 (11th Cir. 2016); 
Neuren v. Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks & Schill, 43 F.3d 1507, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 
1995). 
86 Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 2012); Graham v. Long 
Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000); Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 353 (6th Cir. 1998); Nicholson v. Hyannis Air 
Serv., Inc., 580 F.3d 1116, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009). 
87 Coleman, 667 F.3d at 846 (citations omitted). 
88 Id. at 846. 
89  In prior cases on this issue (see supra note 80), many of the plaintiffs 
brought claims under Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act (“PDA”) for discrimination based on the ability to get pregnant. See 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e(k). This paper will not discuss the dispute over whether the 
PDA applies to contraception and will focus on Title VII without the PDA. 
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To date, there are only two relevant cases that are published, 
reported, and still good law.90 In Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co.,91 a 
federal district court in Washington held that the employer’s 
exclusion of contraceptives was sex discrimination.92 However, in 
In re Union Pac. R.R. Empl. Practices Litig.,93 the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that it was not.94 The remaining cases are 
either unreported or fall under Eighth Circuit precedent.95 Most of 
the courts that have dealt with this issue have used one of two 
comparators: male contraception or preventive treatment.96 
 
1. Male Contraception 
 
A few courts, including the Eighth Circuit, have held that 
health plans that exclude both male and female contraception are 
gender-neutral, because male contraception is the proper 
comparator to female contraception. 97  In Union Pacific, the 
                                                
90 Standridge v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. (In re Union Pac. R.R. Emp’t. Practices 
Litig.), 479 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 2007); Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. 
Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
91 Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266. 
92 Id. at 1272. 
93 Union Pacific, 479 F.3d at 944. 
94 Id. 
95 Cooley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 979 (E.D. Mo. 2003) 
(falling under Eighth Circuit precedent); Alexander v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 
4:02-CV-0252-A, 2002 WL 731815 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2002); Cummins v. 
State, No. 2002-cv-4201-JPG, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42634 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 
30, 2005); Stocking v. AT&T Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (W.D. Mo. 2006), 
vacated, Stocking v. AT&T Corp., No. 03-0421-CV-W-HFS, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 78188 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 22, 2007); Wright v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 
No. 4:03CV1843 CDP, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42366 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 
2005) (falling under Eighth Circuit precedent). 
96 Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1268 (W.D. Wash. 
2001) (holding that the comparison should be with preventive drugs, as well 
as prescription contraceptives); UPS, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1217, 1219 (holding 
that since the employee’s wife took birth control pills for hormone regulation, 
the comparison should be with male hormonal treatments.). 
97 Standridge v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. (In re Union Pac. R.R. Emp’t. Practices 
Litig.), 479 F.3d 936, 944 (8th Cir. 2007); Cummins, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
42634, at *23-25; Alexander, 2002 WL 731815, at *6. 
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employer’s health plan excluded male and female birth control 
“when used for the sole purpose of contraception” but did cover 
female birth control when used for non-contraceptive reasons such 
as “regulating menstrual cycles, treating skin problems or avoiding 
serious health risks associated with pregnancy.”98 A class of female 
employees who used birth control for contraceptive purposes 
brought a lawsuit against their employer. In determining whether 
the plan provided worse coverage to females as compared to males, 
the Eighth Circuit held that male forms of contraception, such as 
condoms and vasectomies, are similar in all relevant respects to 
female forms, such as birth control pills, “sponges, diaphragms, 
intrauterine devices, [and] tubal ligation” because they provide the 
same benefit: prevention of pregnancy.99  
The federal district court in Cummins v. State similarly held 
that a plan was gender-neutral when it excluded all non-surgical 
contraception100 because male and female contraception both stop 
conception.101 The court took on a removed, academic tone when 
explaining that although conception only takes place inside a 
woman’s body, “the process clearly requires the participation of 
both males and females and, critically, the process may therefore be 
prevented by either the male or the female, each of whom is 
consequently equally affected by the exclusion at issue in this 
case.”102 
The Union Pacific and Cummins courts were wrong; male 
birth control is not similar enough to female birth control to make a 
proper comparator. The two decisions rest on the assumption that 
the prevention of pregnancy equally affects men and women, which 
presumes that pregnancy equally affects men and women. But that 
assumption simply is not true. For men, contraception does not 
address a health care need; their bodies will never become pregnant. 
For men, preventing pregnancy will ensure that a man does not have 
                                                
98 Union Pacific, 479 F.3d at 938. 
99 Id. at 944. 
100 Cummins, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42634, at *2 (noting the health plan 
covered vasectomies and tubal ligations, surgical sterilization for men and 
women respectively). 
101 Cummins, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42634, at *25. 
102 Id. at *24-25.  
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to raise another child. For women, in addition to not having to raise 
another child, preventing pregnancy will ensure that a woman’s 
body will not undergo the changes and stress that may negatively 
affect her health.103 This distinction is important in the context of an 
employee health plan. The proper comparison should be between 
treatments for similar health care needs that could be covered by 
health insurance. 
Birth control for men presently takes two forms: condoms 
and vasectomies. In addition to the argument above, condoms are 
not a good comparator to female birth control because they are 
available without a prescription. Health insurance plans generally 
do not cover non-prescription drugs or devices, like condoms. For 
example, Medicare does not cover non-prescription medicines.104 
By contrast, most female forms of birth control require a 
prescription. Birth control pills, IUDs, implants, and even 
diaphragms require a visit to the doctor and the pharmacy in order 
to access them.105 The dissent in Union Pacific noted that condoms 
were not a good comparator because the employer had not identified 
“any health insurance policy which would provide coverage for 
non-prescription, contraceptive devices available in drug stores and 
gas stations nationwide.” 106  The purpose of comparing similar 
                                                
103 Stocking v. AT&T Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1017 (W.D. Mo. 2006), 
vacated, Stocking v. AT&T Corp., No. 03-0421-CV-W-HFS, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 78188 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 22, 2007) (judgment vacated following Union 
Pacific ruling) (noting that contraception has “a major social significance for 
men but avoidance of pregnancy has both social and physical significance for 
women.”).  
104  Joseph Matthews, Services Not Covered by Medicare Part B, NOLO, 
(http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/services-not-covered-medicare-
part-b.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2016). 
105  FDA News Release, FDA approves Plan B One-Step emergency 
contraception for use without a prescription for all women of child-bearing 
potential, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION (June 20, 2013), 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm3580
82.htm (discussing that one notable exception is emergency contraception, 
which the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) approved for sale without 
a prescription in 2013). 
106 Standridge v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. (In re Union Pac. R.R, Emp’t. Practices 
Litig.), 479 F.3d 936, 945 (8th Cir. 2007).  
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treatments is to “eliminate other explanatory variables.” 107  The 
explanation of why an employer would exclude condoms from 
coverage is simple; non-prescription condoms are never covered by 
health insurance.  
The second form of male birth control previously discussed 
is vasectomies. Vasectomies are also not similar enough “in all 
relevant respects” to female birth control to allow for a meaningful 
comparison. Vasectomies are permanent, surgical forms of birth 
control.108 If the dispute was over an employer’s exclusion of tubal 
ligations, the female permanent, surgical form of birth control, 
perhaps comparing the employer’s treatment of vasectomies would 
be apt.109  But the dispute in Hobby Lobby was only over reversible, 
non-surgical forms of female birth control. Permanent birth control 
is much different than reversible forms for several reasons. First, 
vasectomies are a form of surgery. An employer could decide not to 
cover a type of surgery for reasons that would not apply to pills or 
IUDs, such as cost. Second, vasectomies are permanent. An 
employer could decide to cover a permanent form of birth control 
because it may be more cost effective than a temporary form.  
If the basis of the comparison is the medical effect of birth 
control, vasectomies still do not make good comparators to 
reversible forms of contraception used by women. The medical 
                                                
107 Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 2012). 
108  Contraception: Permanent Methods of Birth Control, CENTERS FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (June 21, 2016), 
http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/contraception/index.htm (noting that 
“sterilization is a permanent, safe, and highly effective approach for birth 
control,” and that although most who undergo sterilization “do not regret 
having had the procedure, the permanence of the method is an important 
consideration, as regret has been documented in studies.”). 
109 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2765-66 (2014) 
(noting that the employers objected to two IUDs and two forms of 
emergency contraception known as “morning after” pills); Contraception: 
Permanent Methods of Birth Control, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION (June 21, 2016), 
https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/contraception//index.htm (noting 
IUDs and “morning after” pills are reversible). 
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effect of a vasectomy is permanent sterilization. 110  Men get 
vasectomies when they are either done having children or have 
decided not to have them.111 That is quite different from the medical 
effect of reversible forms of female birth control, which allow 
women to choose to have children by stopping use of the birth 
control. This is important for women who want to have children but 
must get a medical condition under control before their bodies are 
safe for pregnancy. Men do not have to worry if their bodies will be 
safe for childbirth when deciding to father a child.   
 
2. Preventive Treatments 
 
Other courts have used preventive drugs and devices as a 
comparator, since the function of birth control is the prevention of 
pregnancy and related health risks. In Erickson, the court held that 
an employer’s health plan discriminated against women because it 
excluded contraception but covered many preventive drugs.112 The 
employer argued that birth control is different from preventive 
drugs because of what they prevent; the covered drugs prevent 
diseases but pregnancy is not a disease and contraceptive use is 
voluntary.113 But the court held that the function of birth control and 
the covered drugs was the same: although pregnancy is a natural 
state, not a disease, it is “not a state that is desired by all women or 
at all points in a woman’s life.”114 It found that birth control, like 
the other preventive drugs, helps its user avoid certain “health 
consequences,” like “unwanted physical changes” associated with 
pregnancy, as well as emotional, economic, and social 
consequences.115  The comparison between preventive drugs and 
birth control allows the court to “eliminate other explanatory 
                                                
110  Contraception: Permanent Methods of Birth Control, CENTERS FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (June 21, 2016), 
http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/contraception/index.htm. 
111 Id. 
112 Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1268 (W.D. Wash. 
2001). 
113 Id. at 1272 
114 Id. at 1273. 
115 Id.  
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variables” and focus on how the employer regards women’s health 
needs.116 
In Union Pacific, the lower court had chosen as a 
comparator treatments “that prevent employees from developing 
diseases or conditions that pose an equal or lesser threat to 
employees’ health than does pregnancy.”117 The majority explicitly 
disagreed with this comparator without explanation.118 
 
3. Proper Comparators: Preventive Treatments 
 
The proper comparator that courts should use when deciding 
if exclusion of birth control is discriminatory is preventive 
treatments, as they serve the same functions. In addition to the 
arguments discussed above, the argument that birth control is 
similar to other preventive treatments has ample support in the ACA 
and Hobby Lobby. The ACA itself treats birth control as a 
preventive treatment, as both the Hobby Lobby majority and dissent 
note. 119  The majority explained that the mandate is part of the 
“Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines,” which includes not 
only coverage of contraception but also screening and testing 
services.120  
Further, birth control can prevent the worsening of certain 
health conditions and the onset of other, more common pregnancy-
related health risks. The CDC lists several other complications 
associated with pregnancy, including high blood pressure, 
gestational diabetes, depression, preeclampsia, and anemia. 121 
                                                
116 Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 2012). 
117 Standridge v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. (In re Union Pac. R.R. Emp’t. Practices 
Litig.), 479 F.3d 936, 944 (8th Cir. 2007). 
118 Id., n.5. 
119 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762-63 (2014); 
see also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2788 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
120  Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”), Women’s 
Preventive Services Guidelines, http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2016). 
121  Pregnancy Complications, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION (June 17, 2016), 
http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth/pregcomplicati
ons.htm. 
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Thus, to counter the employer’s argument in Erickson that birth 
control use is voluntary, it is not voluntary for all women, just as 
preventive treatment is not mandatory for everyone.  
 
B. Harm 
 
A prima facie case of either disparate treatment or disparate 
impact requires a plaintiff to show that the employer’s action 
affected her adversely.122 An employment action is adverse under 
Title VII if it “materially affects the compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment.” 123  It has also been 
defined as “a significant change in employment status, such as . . . 
a decision causing significant change in benefits.” 124  But “not 
everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable 
adverse action.”125 Discriminatory acts by employers that are not 
adverse “fail as a matter of law.”126 
In the prior Title VII birth control cases, 127  which all 
occurred before the contraceptive mandate, the plaintiffs did not 
face a problem proving that there was an adverse employment 
action because the employer’s exclusion of birth control “materially 
affected” the value of their health plan. Like the male employees, 
the female employees were given health insurance as a benefit to 
their employment, but that benefit was worth less to female 
                                                
122 Perry v. Donovan, 733 F. Supp. 2d 114, 119 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
123 Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding 
that giving employee a disproportionate amount of dangerous and strenuous 
work was an adverse employment action; giving her gloves and vest of only 
slightly inferior quality were not adverse actions). 
124 Perry, 733 F. Supp. 2d 114 (holding that failure to allow employee to 
compete for a promotion which would have increased her salary was an 
adverse employment action). 
125 Smart v Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
adverse actions must affect the terms and conditions of employment but that 
negative evaluations, without more, are not adverse employment actions). 
126 Id. 
127 See supra Part II.A. 
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employees than to males because females had to pay out of pocket 
for birth control prescriptions.128  
With the ACA’s contraceptive mandate and the Hobby 
Lobby ruling, however, a for-profit employer’s decision not to cover 
birth control for religious reasons does not mean that the employee 
has to pay full price. Under the accommodation devised in Hobby 
Lobby, “female employees would continue to receive contraceptive 
coverage without cost sharing for all FDA-approved contraceptives, 
and they would continue to face minimal logistical and 
administrative obstacles because their employers’ insurers would be 
responsible for providing information and coverage.”129 The only 
difference between the plan’s coverage of birth control and its 
coverage of other drugs or devices, from the female employees’ 
perspective, is that they will know that their employer has played no 
role in providing contraceptive coverage.130 Plaintiffs could argue 
that that is a “significant change in benefits,” but it is not one that 
“materially affects” them. Without a material harm, there is no 
claim.  
When analyzing the adverse employment action, courts 
should address what the employer provides to its employees, not 
what employees obtain by other means. For example, if an employer 
offers health insurance only to its male employees but not to its 
female employees, the employer should not be able to satisfy its 
legal obligations under Title VII by arguing that its choice was non-
discriminatory because its female employees get insurance through 
their husbands’ employers. Likewise, Title VII should analyze what 
the employer provides to the employee, not what the insurer pays 
for and provides under the Hobby Lobby arrangement.  
 
1. Zubik v. Burwell 
 
The hypothetical above foreshadows one development of 
the law in this area. While Hobby Lobby was being decided by the 
Court, employers with religious objections to birth control 
                                                
128  Mauldin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. Civ.A.1:01-CV2755-JEC, 2002 
WL 2022334, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 23, 2002). 
129 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2782 (2014). 
130 Priests for Life v. United States HHS, 772 F.3d 229, 236 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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continued to demand that they be released from having any 
involvement in the provision of birth control coverage to their 
employees. The next wave of cases was brought by religious 
nonprofits that argued that the accommodation itself unlawfully 
burdened their religious exercise under RFRA.131 These cases are 
important because the more detached the Court allows employers to 
become from the provision of their employees’ birth control 
coverage, the better the argument is that the employer is not actually 
providing the birth control coverage and therefore, the health plan 
the employer provides discriminates against women. Additionally, 
the majority opinion in Hobby Lobby stated that for-profit 
corporations should be treated the same as nonprofits in terms of 
accommodating their religious beliefs, 132  which means that the 
Court’s decision regarding nonprofits will eventually be extended 
to for-profits corporations and organizations.  
On May 16, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a ruling in 
Zubik v. Burwell,133 a consolidation of seven cases dealing with the 
same issue. The plaintiffs were several religious nonprofits, 
Catholic colleges and charity organizations that were allowed an 
accommodation under the ACA.134 The nonprofits argued that the 
religious accommodation under the ACA forces them to perform an 
action (notifying the government of their religious objections) that 
triggers birth control coverage, which makes them complicit in the 
sin of facilitating birth control use. 135  The plaintiff employers 
wanted  to be released from having any connection to the provision 
of birth control in their employee health plan.  
The Court ultimately did not make a decision in Zubik on 
the merits of the case.136  Instead, it asked the employers and the 
government to work out a deal on their own. 137  The nonprofit 
                                                
131 Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016). 
132 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771. 
133 Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1557 
134 Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 236. Priests for Life was one of the cases that 
was consolidated into Zubik v. Burwell when the Court granted certiorari.   
135 Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 236. 
136 Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1560. 
137 Id. (holding that “the parties on remand should be afforded an opportunity 
to arrive at an approach going forward that accommodates petitioners' 
religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by 
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employers said that they would not feel their religious exercise was 
infringed if they could purchase a plan for their employees that did 
not include birth control coverage.138 The government said that it 
could modify the existing accommodation in such a way that the 
employer would not have to notify the government and the 
government could still ensure that contraceptive coverage was 
provided. 139  Under this scheme, the employer is not actually 
providing contraceptive coverage; the insurer is providing it. While 
there still may be an issue of harm, there is a stronger argument 
under these cases that the employer is providing unequal benefits to 
its employees because of their sex. 
 
2. New Administration 
 
Another, more dramatic change may take place regarding 
this area of the law with the recent change in governmental 
administration. On January 20, 2017, Donald Trump became the 
45th President of the United States.140 Additionally, Republicans 
currently hold the majority in both the House of Representatives and 
the Senate.141 The fate of the ACA and the contraceptive mandate 
is unknown under this administration. Mr. Trump and the 
Republican members of Congress have vowed to “repeal and 
replace” the ACA but to date, they have not been successful.142  
                                                
petitioners' health plans ‘receive full and equal health coverage, including 
contraceptive coverage.’”). 
138 Id. 
139 Id.  
140  Peter Baker and Michael D. Shear, Donald Trump is Sworn In as 
President, Capping His Swift Assent, N.Y. TIMES (January 20, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/20/us/politics/trump-inauguration-
day.html?_r=0. 
141 United States Senate Press Gallery, 115th Congress: Party Lineup, (January 
3, 2017), https://www.dailypress.senate.gov/?page_id=228 (noting 52 
Republican Senators, 46 Democrats, 2 Independents); United States House of 
Representatives Press Gallery, Party Breakdown, 115th Congress, (April 25, 
2017), https://pressgallery.house.gov/member-data/party-breakdown (noting 
238 Republicans, 193 Democrats, 4 vacancies). 
142 On May 4, 2017, the House passed a healthcare bill to repeal the ACA, 
which would not repeal the contraceptive mandate. Thomas Kaplan and 
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If the new administration repeals the contraceptive mandate, 
there will be no need for Hobby Lobby’s accommodation 
mechanism; employers will be free to exclude contraception in 
health plans for any reason, unless a state law applies.143 The main 
obstacle to the Title VII claim in this Note is the lack of harm 
because Hobby Lobby requires contraceptive coverage by the 
insurer, if not the employer.144 But if that requirement is repealed 
and employees have to pay out of pocket, they will suffer a material 
harm, and will have a viable claim under Title VII.  
 
IV.  DISPARATE IMPACT AND DISPARATE TREATMENT 
 
If plaintiffs can prove their prima facie case of 
discrimination, then the claim proceeds to the next phase in the 
                                                
Robert Pear, House Passes Measure to Repeal and Replace Affordable Care 
Act, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2017); Timothy Jost, Executive Order Addresses 
Religious Objections to Contraception, HEALTHAFFAIRSBLOG (May 5, 
2017), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2017/05/05/executive-order-addresses-
religious-objections-to-contraception/ (explaining that the House’s healthcare 
bill, the American Health Care Act, does not repeal the contraceptive 
mandate).Also on May 4, 2017, the President issued an Executive Order, in 
part directing the Secretary of Health and Human Services and other agency 
heads to “consider issuing amended regulations to address” religious 
objections to the contraceptive mandate. Presidential Executive Order 
Promoting Free Speech and Religious Liberty, Sec. 3, 2017 WL 1734772, 
(May 4, 2017); Timothy Jost, an emeritus professor at Washington and Lee 
University School of Law, wrote that “HHS could, through notice and 
rulemaking” remove contraceptives from the list of preventive services 
insurers must cover, but that that would be “politically and legally risky.” 
Timothy Jost, Executive Order Addresses Religious Objections to 
Contraception, HEALTHAFFAIRSBLOG (May 5, 2017), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2017/05/05/executive-order-addresses-
religious-objections-to-contraception/. 
143 Kara Loewentheil, The Satanic Temple, Scott Walker, and Contraception: 
A Partial Account of Hobby Lobby’s Implications for State Law, 9 HARV. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 89, 98-101 (2015) (explaining that most states have 
contraceptive equity laws requiring insurance companies, and possibly 
employers, to cover contraceptives but that many also allow a religious 
exemption from the law); see also Jost, supra note 142 (noting that 28 states 
require insurers to offer women contraceptive coverage). 
144 See supra Part II.B. 
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litigation. This section analyzes both the disparate impact and the 
disparate treatment causes of action, since most of the plaintiffs in 
the prior cases brought their case under both.145 Part A analyzes the 
disparate impact cause of action first, because that claim avoids 
inquiry into the employer’s religious motive, and Part B considers 
the disparate treatment claim. 
 
A. Disparate Impact 
 
Once plaintiffs have proven the prima facie case of disparate 
impact, that the employer’s exclusion of birth control from the 
health plan caused an adverse impact on female employees, the 
employer can escape liability only if it proves that its action was 
“job related for the position in question and consistent with business 
necessity.” 146  The employer has the burden to persuade the 
factfinder of this.147 Courts have interpreted “business necessity” to 
mean “necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the 
business.”148 
An employer could argue, for example, that it excluded birth 
control from its health plan to control costs, which businesses must 
be permitted to do.149  In Erickson, the court held that while an 
employer may take measures to control costs, it may not do so in a 
discriminatory manner.150 Hobby Lobby could argue that excluding 
contraception is consistent with business necessity because the 
purpose of its business is to “[h]onor[] the Lord” by “operating the 
                                                
145  EEOC v. UPS, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (Minn. 2001); Erickson v. 
Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001); Mauldin v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., No. Civ.A.1:01-CV2755-JEC, 2002 WL 2022334 (N.D. 
Ga. Aug. 23, 2002); Cooley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 979 
(E.D. Mo. 2003); Cummins v. State, No. 2002-cv-4201-JPG, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 42634 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2005); Stocking v. AT&T Corp., 436 F. 
Supp. 2d 1014 (W.D. Mo. 2006). 
146 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
147 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1004 (1988). 
148 Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971). 
149 Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1274 (W.D. Wash. 
2001). 
150 Id. 
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company in a manner consistent with Biblical principles.”151 But 
that is not related in any way “to the safe and efficient operation of 
the business.”152  
In summary, if plaintiff employees can prove a prima facie 
case of disparate impact, the claim will be successful because the 
employer will not be able to show that the policy of excluding 
contraception is consistent with business necessity.  
 
B. Disparate Treatment 
 
The prima facie case of disparate treatment is similar to the 
prima facie claim of disparate impact. As noted above, a plaintiff 
must show that “(1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she was 
subjected to an adverse job action; (3) the employer treated similarly 
situated employees outside her protected class more favorably; and 
(4) she was qualified to do the job.”153 If the plaintiff can prove that 
she suffered an adverse job action,154  and, that she was treated 
unequally,155  she can prove a prima facie case because she can 
easily meet the remainder of the requirements, as she is a woman, 
and for the sake of argument, she is qualified for her job. 
 
1. Employer’s Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory 
Reason 
 
After a plaintiff proves her prima facie case, the burden 
shifts to the employer to prove that it had a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for taking the action it took.156 This is a light 
burden as it is a burden of production, not persuasion.157 All the 
employer has to produce is an affidavit from the business owners, 
explaining their religious beliefs about contraception. The employer 
may also produce a copy of the notice it submitted to the 
                                                
151 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2766 (2014). 
152 Robinson, 444 F.2d at 798. 
153 Lindemann, supra note 80. 
154 See supra Part II.B. 
155 See supra Part II.A. 
156 Texas Dep’t of Comty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981). 
157 Id. at 256. 
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government, explaining the reason for requesting the 
accommodation.158 The employer can easily meet this burden. 
 
2. Pretext 
 
Upon producing an affidavit or notice submitted to the 
government, the burden shifts back to the employee to prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the employer’s purported 
reason for the action is pretextual.159 The employees can succeed at 
this stage by showing that the employer’s reason is “unworthy of 
credence” or “that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated 
the employer.”160  
When the employer asserts a religious reason for its action, 
the plaintiff may not question whether the religious reason is 
“plausible in the sense that it is reasonably or validly held.”161 
However, courts have held that plaintiffs can inquire as to whether 
that reason is the real reason that motivated the action.162 When 
analyzing whether a religious reason is pretextual, courts should 
look at “factual questions such as . . . whether the rule applied to the 
plaintiff has been applied evenly.”163 In Redhead v. Conference of 
Seventh Day Adventists, the court found that although it accepted 
that the employer’s reason for firing a pregnant, unmarried teacher 
was honestly based on its religious beliefs forbidding sex outside of 
marriage, the court could still inquire as to whether or not the 
employer applied that belief equally to its male and female 
employees.164 
In the legal situation addressed here, the issue is whether the 
employer applied its belief that contraception is a sin to both men 
and women in its healthcare plan. As previously noted, it is difficult 
to determine whether the employer intentionally discriminated 
                                                
158 Priests for Life v. United States HHS, 772 F.3d 229, 249 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
159 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255. 
160 Id. 
161 Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 440 F. Supp. 2d 211, 
223 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (citations omitted). 
162 Redhead, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 223. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
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because there is no prescription male birth control that it could have 
also excluded. It may be relevant to consider if the employer also 
excluded vasectomies because that is the only form of male birth 
control it could affirmatively exclude,165 although vasectomies are 
not equivalent to female birth control. 166  In the case of Hobby 
Lobby, it is especially difficult to make this inquiry because the 
employers’ legitimate reason is based on their religious beliefs 
about conception, 167  which only takes place inside a woman’s 
body. 168  Unlike in Redhead, where men could also violate the 
employer’s prohibition on sex outside of marriage, only women can 
use prescription birth control so only they can be targeted by the 
employer’s beliefs. This is another reason why preventive 
treatments are a better comparator than male birth control.  
 
3.  Mixed Motive 
 
A mixed motive case is one in which the plaintiffs have 
proven that the employer’s consideration of their sex played a 
“motivating part”169 in its decision, even though the employer has 
shown that it was legitimately motivated by its religious beliefs. 
One way to prove that sex played a “motivating part” in the decision 
                                                
165 See Part II.A. There are only two forms of male birth control: condoms and 
vasectomies. Exclusion of condoms does not indicate the employer made an 
affirmative choice because most health plans do not cover condoms. 
166 See supra Part II.A(i). 
167 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2764-65 (2014). 
168 Id. at 2765. As explained earlier, the employers in Hobby Lobby objected 
to the forms of birth control they believed functioned like an abortion, which 
they called “abortifacients.” The employers believe life begins at conception 
and these forms of birth control may operate to block a fertilized egg from 
growing. See supra note 36. 
169 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1991) (“[A]n unlawful employment practice is 
established when the complaining party demonstrates that . . . sex was a 
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also 
motivated the practice.”); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-
45 (1989), superseded by statute 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1991) (noting that 
plaintiff may show that gender played a “motivating part” in the decision). 
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is by showing that the employer systematically treated female 
employees worse than male employees.170  
Under Title VII, a plaintiff will prevail in a mixed motives 
case and get full damages unless the employer can prove that it 
would have made the same decision regardless of the discriminatory 
motive. 171  If the employer proves this, the plaintiffs may still 
prevail, but the remedies available will be limited. 172  The 
employer’s burden is one of persuasion, not simply of production.173 
Even if the court agrees that the employer considered both 
its religious beliefs and its employees’ sex in its decision, and even 
if the employer can prove it would have made the same decision 
regardless, plaintiffs may still prevail. They would still have access 
to injunctive relief, meaning they could require their employers to 
comply with the contraceptive mandate and cover birth control.  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Title VII provides legal protection from employment 
discrimination on the basis of sex but it is not the only law that fights 
sex discrimination in the workplace. The ACA’s contraceptive 
mandate remedies inequality in employee health insurance plans by 
requiring equal coverage for female healthcare needs. Without birth 
control coverage, the employee health plan is worth less to female 
employees than to males. In Hobby Lobby, however, the U.S. 
Supreme Court allowed three employers to avoid complying with 
the contraceptive mandate because of their religious objections to 
contraception, a treatment so common that 88% of American 
women have used it in their lifetime.174 The Court did not consider 
that the employer would be discriminating against its female 
employees by allowing this. Title VII should be able to remedy this 
discrimination.  
                                                
170 Troupe v. May Dep’t. Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 1994). 
171 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
172 Id. (limiting remedies to injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and attorneys’ 
fees and costs when an employer proves it would have made the same 
decision regardless of the discriminatory motive). 
173 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 245. 
174 DANIELS, supra note 22. 
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While it is fortunate that the ACA requires contraceptive 
coverage so that female employees suffer no loss of benefits, it is 
unfortunate that this allows the employer with religious objections 
to discriminate against its female employees. But changes are 
imminent and female employees may suffer a loss of benefits if the 
new administration takes action. If and when that happens, Title VII 
must once again stand up for women’s rights in the workplace.  
